

The 'daily' reality of partition

Politics in newsprint, in 1940s Kanpur¹

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Nations are necessarily exercises in remembrance and forgetting; they remember through ritual commemoration and forget through collective amnesia. In the fiftieth year of their Independence, Indians however, decided to commemorate what they had hitherto chosen to suppress or forget. As the subaltern became the authorized alternative to elite officialdom, quite a few sacred binaries were opened up, if not reversed. Partition as the effaced annexe to our national history became the privileged site for such corrective treatment. So half a century after it happened, Partition and not just Pakistan - which has always been a constant with the Indian state and people - again found itself at the centre of both political rhetoric and academic ruminations.

But Pakistan and Partition had always made good copy. Right from its ill-defined birth in 1940, through the myriad definitions that were attached to it, till 1947, when its contours first became visible, the Pakistan demand was one sure way for politicians of all hues to get reported on the front page of national and local newspapers. The imprecise parameters of the idea of Pakistan added to its mystique. It travelled the whole gamut of terrain from utopia to dystopia. On the one hand, it was heralded as a panacea for all the problems of Indian Muslims (and of India, by extension), on the other, it was decried as a satanic conspiracy aiming to indefinitely stall India's march towards freedom and progress. A thematic developed with Partition and Pakistan at its centre. Major national events - Quit India movement, Cripps and Cabinet missions, Rajagopalachari Plan, Mountbatten Plan and so on - followed one after another; local incidents abided their own dynamic. There remained, however, a kind of basic continuity in the way all these happenings were articulated by the contemporary press and digested by the public opinion. News of various 'happenings' was refracted through the prism of Pakistan: the reader was encouraged to understand these newsworthy happenings through the over-arching categories of nation, culture, religion, history and tradition - all of which were seen as hostage to the notion of Pakistan, or conversely, for the Muslim League sympathizers, to be actualised only through Pakistan itself.

Historians have used newspapers mostly to corroborate opinions and viewpoints backed by hard archival data. Works on the print media have seldom gone further than commenting on its links with political parties, or on the impact of the national movement on the press. The press is seen as a contemporary commentator, a kind of participant observer of the political scene, and it is this very participatory nature which supposedly makes the newspaper unfit to serve as an unbiased and objective historical source. Moreover, the non-fixed nature of the newspaper - in Benedict Anderson's phrase 'the one-day best-seller' - denies it the very finality normally associated with printed texts.² Conversely, the newspapers have also been used as direct pointers to popular consciousness. But rarely have

they been opened up to historical scrutiny as historical agents involved in the formation of discursive structures that map events.

A product of modernity, the newspaper ventures information that is instant and efficient. Efficiency and speed in collection and dispatch are vital for the dissemination of news as print. The mechanics of this rendering of the event into news is, however, a temporal process that is kept well hidden from view. What is overlooked, or wilfully forgotten is that the 'daily' gives news that is delayed, by at least a day.³ Yet this late news has a kind of immediacy - for the reader the event happens only when it flashes as printed news. Moreover, the spatial economy of the newspaper conveys the relative importance and newsworthiness of the event: front-page left side (the right-side, in case of Urdu newspapers) news in bold typeface solicits attention as an event of signal importance. It remains in this privileged position till another of its ilk shifts it to the inner pages, or even out of the paper, and finally out of the reader's mind. The format of news production then automatically limits news reception. News values and news judgements not only direct our thinking to specific areas, but also direct it away from other, apparently non-important, areas, contributing thus to our mental maps of the world. In the realm of politics, they define - and define away - opposition.⁴

Analyses of news value show that this choosing and prioritising of information is not random but involves an implicit understanding of the nature of society, the location of power in it, as also a notion of how this power is or should be exercised. Key categories of newsworthiness - the elite, the government, political parties - all have, according to Stuart Hall, the routine knowledge of social structures inscribed within them. "To be intelligible to its audience the press must infer what is already known, as a present or abstract structure, but [this structure] is a construction and interpretation about the world".⁵

It is an 'interpretation' that parades itself as truth. This was also the case with colonial India, in the 1940s. The press was then, for many, the only available means of engaging with the wider world. Most contemporary newspapers were openly partisan (of course with an eye on the colonial censor), though partisanship was glorified as service to the national movement. A nation could only be made if 'national facts' were known by all. The press, and especially the vernacular press, rendered singular service in disseminating the preferred nationalist view of the events, as the only correct way of understanding them. Moreover, many a time the truth offered by the press was the only version that reached the individual in a small town or *qasba*.

By commenting on and reiterating ad infinitum a subject - say, for example, Pakistan - the press in effect constructs images. These images, like coins of exchange, acquire public acceptability and can be recalled by the sheer mention of a single word, or by a news clip from the past. Crucially, this image cannot be dismissed as irrational fabrication. The veracity of the press account may be questioned by some, but few people would doubt that the event reported took place in some other way. "For people living in a second hand world... symbols focus experience (and) meanings organize knowledge, guiding the surface perceptions of an instant no less than the aspirations of a life-time".⁶

The dependence on mediated knowledge about the world increased manifold in a milieu where the levels of literacy were not very high but the level of political participation was considerable. Along with pamphlets and posters, newspapers formed the basic source

of knowledge about leaders and political parties. The only other means of mass communication remained the grand sabha or public meeting, often organized as reaction to reports (gathered primarily from newspapers) about events or calamities of national importance. As riots took hold of the country from about 1946 to 1948, Kanpur was deluged with various 'days' being celebrated or observed. There was a Noakhali Diwas to protest against atrocities on Hindus in Noakhali, a Bihar Day (*yaum-e-Bihar*) for those against Muslims, and a Pakistan Day that was countered - not through a Hindustan Day but, interestingly by a Punjab *Diwas*. These were organized after reports of massacres or riots were published by the local newspaper. In turn, these sabhas themselves were news enough to get reported in local papers, often inciting other reports and events. Beyond such obvious relations between these 'aural' gatherings and printed material, orality freely, and crucially, intermixed with printing and literacy. The last and most often, the mass audience of the newspaper was the one that heard it - transliterated, moreover, from the *shuddha bhasha* (pure language) into a variety of regional, local dialects, and explained with the help of familiar, and frequently, even familial metaphors and analogies.⁷

It is to open up and interrogate these images that accrued to Pakistan and Partition at a local level that I look towards the *Vartman*, a local but immensely popular newspaper published from Kanpur during the 1940s. In its pages, Partition is enacted at various levels, and Pakistan established, before it actually came into being. In its own way, the *Vartman* was engaged in outlining and consolidating a realm of knowledge that revolved around Hindustan and Pakistan, nation and community, religion and individuals, Hindus and Muslims, and others different from them. Though these characterizations were formed over years, Partition made them more strident and uncompromising. Inasmuch as *Vartman* was involved in the fashioning of this discourse in Kanpur, and as much as it was part of it, it offers insights into the complexities of the movements for and against Pakistan.

By the 1940s, *Vartman* was an influential presence in the journalistic landscape of Kanpur. The first and only daily paper to be consistently published from Kanpur for about two decades, *Vartman* positioned itself as the plebeian counterpart to the *Pratap*, the better-known weekly printed from Kanpur. From the very beginning Ramashankar Awasthi, its proprietor and editor, very consciously located the paper within a *Kanpuriya* idiom. Almost all its pages were steeped in local colour. National news was of course important, but its local ramifications mattered more to *Vartman*. Interestingly, the process through which the news of a national event got translated into local jargon was quite transparent in *Vartman*. The paper framed its report in three stages. The first was when an event made it to the front page as news.⁸ Catchy headlines laid out the paper's - and supposedly its readers' - reaction to the news. Stage two appeared two days later: a long editorial on what presumably was judged as the most important news item worth commenting on. This editorial delineated the relative importance, or non-importance, of the 'news' and placed it in its historical context. It broadcast for its audience the 'actual' meaning and the correct way of understanding the event/news. Stage three commenced - again approximately after two days - when the daily satirical column "Manoranjan" unscrambled that editorial for popular entertainment. Through a dialogic tone and impudent lampooning, the argument was given a local inflexion, placing it firmly within the realm of the prevalent common sense.

Vartman addressed its own, largely Hindu, audience in Kanpur. This predominantly upper caste (though not always upper class) readership was divided politically between the Congress - and its two factions in Kanpur - and the local Hindu *Sabha*. *Vartman*, in deference to this division, was constantly engaged in a delicate balancing act. In spite of the paper's latent leanings towards the Hindu *Sabha*, the national stature of leaders like Nehru and Gandhi almost always tipped the scale towards the Congress. Most of the time, however, *Vartman* tried to walk the tightrope - rooting for the Congress while fraternizing with the local Hindu *Sabha*. As such, it offered a perfect platform for the Congress right wing, which by 1945, had come to hegemonise and author the public discourse in Kanpur.

From around the time C. Rajagopalachari put forward his argument for a rational consideration of the Pakistan demand (July 1944), and convinced Gandhi to hold talks with Jinnah, the paper's rhetoric was crowded with the motif of Pakistan. Notwithstanding the still ambivalent nature of Jinnah's Pakistan, *Vartman*'s Pakistan was understood as an all-encompassing catastrophe about to befall India: a death-wish from "the unparalleled horrors of which even a thousand Gandhis (sic!) would not be able to save India, its history and culture".⁹ Gandhi's consent to meet Jinnah at the latter's house in Bombay was portrayed as his acquiescing in the demand for Pakistan. Further, 'Gandhi's love for Muslims' and his 'mastery of the art of surrender' was a pointer that *shuddha*, unalloyed Pakistan would inevitably result out of such meetings. Jinnah's rebuffs to Gandhi's offer were insults added to injury, and the breakdown of the talks was something to be welcomed. *Sab achcha hi hua!* (All's well that ends well!) was the paper's verdict on the episode.

For *Vartman*, Pakistan was not just synonymous with Muslim communalism, though it was primarily that. The discomfiture with Pakistan - at such an early date when its contours had hardly taken shape - was that it questioned, centrally, the totalising narrative of Indian nationalism. *Vartman* showed Pakistan as miasmatic: it totally destabilized the category of nationalism, making it open and accessible to all other groups within the political spectrum. As the paper remarked early on, "giving in to the Pakistan demand would only lead to endless partitions. We will not be able to sit peacefully.... All minorities would ask for the right to self-determination. How would we then stop them? Even women... would one day demand a separate *Jananistan*".

To counter the Muslim League's two-nation theory, *Vartman* (almost) posited India as a multi-national entity, led into modernity and progress under the aegis of the Congress party. The Congress's seminal work of infusing the spirit of nationalism into an eternal but fragmented India, was what legitimised its (attempted) monopoly of the national political space. Since Pakistan had opened a Pandora's box by contesting this monopoly, a radical restructuring of the nationalist discourse was required. Either the discursive limits of the nation were to be modified/extended beyond the ideal represented by the Congress, or, conversely, various contesting groups/nations be disciplined and appropriated within a hierarchised (rather than homogenized) nationalism. *Vartman*'s advice was to go for the second option. It provided a blueprint for it. If the Congress represented the modern, constructed version of Indian nationalism (*svadhintapriya*), the Hindu *Mahasabha* represented the 'natural' nationalism (*svabhavik rashtravad*) inherent in the Hindu community. Members of the Hindu *Mahasabha*, the Ambedkar-ites, Dalits and other such groups were argued to be plain 'sel-

fish' nationalists (*swarthvadi*), while the Muslim League, at the nadir of this scheme, represented 'aberrant' nationalism- indeed, communalism - based on fraudulent principles, without any legacy of participation in the freedom struggle, or of any kind of sacrifice for the nation.

It can be seen that this hierarchical layout took care of both the past and the future, while adroitly delineating the present. The *svadheentapriya* could agree to partition - Pakistan - but certainly not the *rashtravadi* for whom the territorial unity of the country was as sacred, if not more, than a territorially compromised freedom. Since both freedom and integrity were desirable, the political impasse could only be overcome if these two categories of nationalism borrowed from each other rather than remain separate - and opposed - political entities. Only then - by the sheer weight of majority - would true nationalism be able to realize complete liberation and block any kind of Pakistan, *Achhootistan* or (god forbid!) *Jananistan*. *Vartman* was prophetic in asking for this convergence. Its pages soon recorded Veer Savarkar's entreaty to Congressmen to join the Hindu *Mahasabha*, followed, a mere twenty days later, by Sardar Patel's invitation to the *Mahasabha* members to join the Congress in their fight for 'the unity and integrity of India'.

Since Pakistan at this point existed more in the pronouncements of the leaders, *Vartman* too framed its argument through them. Gandhi and Jinnah formed two levers against which the narrative of the paper was positioned. Till about 1944, Jinnah was viewed more as a strong and powerful leader, well able to extract his 'blank cheque' from Gandhi and the Congress. With the fragmented Muslim politics of the United Provinces acknowledging his supremacy, the Hindi press was not far behind in lionizing him as such. It is interesting that though he was projected as leading a paper organization rife with internal squabbles (all of which was reported with much glee), Jinnah's leadership over the Muslim masses was never questioned. Rather, a messianic appeal was attributed to him: "Mr. Jinnah is as popular among Muslims as Gandhiji is among Congressmen". However, "unlike Gandhi, Jinnah commands a community of chauvinistic, aggressive believers. United by religion and passionate about it, they were compelled by the force of their belief to wipe out the kafirs". This fanatical zeal, when coupled with the 'backwardness' of the Muslims, made them incapable of nationalist thought. With Jinnah obstinately clinging on to the Pakistan demand, his image, however, increasingly began to take negative overtones. Throughout 1944-47, *Vartman* portrayed Jinnah as an irrational and overbearing madman. Even his inconsequential interviews and speeches were reported on the front page, and always with reference to Pakistan. By the mid-1940s Jinnah had no other identity left, save that of the satanic progenitor of the idea of Pakistan. In a curious reversal, Jinnah was imaged, through Pakistan, the child becoming the father of the man.

Gandhi, on the other hand, largely led the Hindus, who, according to *Vartman*, were a community of disinterested, inert nationalists - a people whose "political behaviour is marked by cowardice, religious enthusiasm by lethargy and who are hopelessly fragmented socially". In short, a people who had made a virtue of passivity by calling it toleration. Though earlier the paper was as deferent to Gandhi as any other nationalist organ of the forties, the centre staging of Jinnah gradually took some shine off the stature of the Mahatma. The preferred and oft-repeated analogy for Gandhi and Jinnah became that of Chamberlain and Hitler - Gandhi, like Chamberlain, bending backwards to appease the fire-

brand, aggressive Hitleresque Jinnah. Mere willingness to negotiate with Jinnah was construed as his approval of Jinnah's designs, as along with 'loving' Muslims, Gandhi "is adept in the art of surrender". However, his personal authority was still powerful enough to carry the nation along, to force his decision on the Congress. Nothing would stop Pakistan from becoming a reality once Gandhi endorsed it. Hence the need to contain Gandhi, to make him weak: he was reminded of his old age and ill health and repeatedly advised to spend the rest of his days in peace. His vow that Pakistan would be made over his dead body was constantly thrown at him. All present political and communal ills of the country were laid at his door, and all these ills stemmed from his advocacy (and practice) of the appeasement of Muslims. This was another pre-history of Partition which was being written not with the fanatical Muslim but with Gandhian politics at the centre.

Vartman's fascinating dialogue with Pakistan did not limit itself to major leaders. It layered its discourse progressively, encountering Partition/Pakistan strategically at the national, provincial and local level politics. *Vartman* gave pride of place to those Muslim groups, who publicly opposed the idea of Pakistan. These groups consisted, in the United Provinces, mainly of Muslim divines connected to the *Jamait-ul-Ulema*, or to groups like the Momins, the Ahrars and the Khaksars. Accordingly, all the paraphernalia of news was provided: bold typeset, approving editorials, op-ed articles and "Manoranjan" applauding endorsement - *ek Musalman yeh hain, ek aap hain*. (Look at these Muslims, and look at you [the Leaguers]). News values, however, cannot be just attached, howsoever good the intentions. It soon became clear, especially after the Simla Conference, that these were but marginal voices railing against the chorus of support for the *Qaid* and his dreamland. As it became clear that their affirmation of faith in the Indian nation and the Congress was not enough reason for the British to veto the League, the paper lost even the rudiment of interest in their politics. Devoid of official weightage as well as popular support, these 'other' Muslim voices were not news anymore.

The Non-League Muslims who remained much longer in the news were the Nationalist Muslims. Seen as the last vestige of sanity left in the Muslim community, Nationalist Muslims showcased the secular credentials of the Congress. Jeered by the Muslim League and its sympathizers, they were handled with kid gloves by the Hindi press. These were the 'others' who had overcome their otherness: what better example of the syncretic nature of Indian nationalism than to have members of the 'other' nation speaking 'our' language. Azad, Humayun Kabir, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, Hamid Khan and Abdul Qayum were given prominence in the pages of *Vartman*. Scuffles, brickbats among Leaguers and Nationalist Muslims during provincial elections in Kanpur, were 'prime' news material. The arguments of Nationalist Muslims against Pakistan were given prominence, as if they emanated from some inborn knowledge, from an area of an authentic Muslim-ness to which they had privileged natural access.

Inevitably, Pakistan managed to spoil even this idyllic relationship. As the paper adopted an increasingly strident tone, and as it manufactured the Muslim 'others' suited to this tone, these *Kangressi* Muslims seemed too utopian - and, hence, unreliable. The construction of a rhetoric against the Muslim nation required the presence of that nation, of a unified Muslim community, for, if the Hindus had to fight Pakistan effectively, they had to

realize that Pakistan could exist almost anywhere. Indeed, that Pakistan was synonymous with being Muslim; that Muslims cannot be internally differentiated; that all Muslims - even the friendly neighbour, the ulema or the Momin, and the Nationalist Muslim - were primarily Muslims. Protestations to the contrary, their political identity would always remain conditioned by their natural religious identity. Collapsing Nationalist Muslim with 'Muslim nationalists' of the League variety, the paper projected a much more homogenized Muslim community than even the League could have hoped for. Those very Muslims, who had been stalwarts of the Congress nationalism, were now termed closet Leaguers. As Pakistan inched forward, it transformed all Muslims into its potential citizens, Pakistanis, divinely ordained, as it were, to sympathize with the Islamic homeland.

The realization of Pakistan expectedly made matters worse for Nationalist Muslims. The ever curious prefix 'nationalist' before their names was as if erased overnight. These, along with countless other Muslims - unconcerned with nomenclature but consistent in their opposition to Pakistan - who opted to stay in India, were converted into the residual category of 'three crore Muslims left in India', to be held as hostages, in their earlier homeland. Their allegiance to the Indian state cannot but be suspect. If they insisted in professing loyalty, they were required to provide proof - "by fighting (read killing) their Pakistani brethren in Punjab". Within a span of five years, Muslims - who had earlier been Nationalists, Leaguers, Momins, Ahrars, Khaksars, *ulema*, landlords, peasants, workers, neighbours, men, women, children, hostage - became solely, outsiders, Pakistanis, and enemies of the nation for *Vartman*.¹⁰

Locally, this increasingly virulent Hindu discourse received reinforcement through the riots that ravaged the nation around this time. The death toll, predictably, did not differentiate between nations and peoples, though competing discourses certainly did.¹¹ The *Vartman* pontificated, "It is not necessary, now, to point out the community which starts the riots".

The Kanpur news page (*Kanpur ki Diary*) offered local, neighbourly, everyday examples to this theorisation. Though disturbances took place only in November 1946 and in April 1947, the city atmosphere generally was rife with tension. There was a perceptible increase in mutual suspicion between the two communities. Witness these news reports and letters to the editor in *Kanpur ki Diary*: *Chief ki zyadati: Hindu gharon mein gana-bajana band* (Highhandedness of the Chief: Ban on music in Hindu houses), when a police inspector, Usman Ali, intervened in a noisy birthday party going on outside a local *masjid*, during the time of namaaz. *Miyanji ki paintare-bazi: roz roz naye shagufe ho rahe hain* (The antics of Miyanji: new mischiefs are being invented daily), was about a Muslim priest who challenged an old woman throwing garbage in the *masjid* premises. Again, it was not right that "the Hindus of the ward Patkapur have to cross three Muslim *bastis* in order to reach the ration shop and are greatly inconvenienced".

These were small incidents (if that) causing disproportionate alarm, exaggerated and amplified responses to perceived threats magnified by press coverage. The phobic unease of people living next door was fuelled by widespread rumours, and *Vartman's* relationship with them is clear. Rumours increasingly found their way in print, thereby gaining credibility and legitimacy. The Pakistan-in-every-mohalla that *Vartman* was cautioning against was largely a product of such rumour mongering.

Vartman's relationship with the 'Pakistan rumours' was contingent upon its changing relationship with the idea of Pakistan itself. In the early forties (up till 1945), *Vartman* strove to counter rumours circulating in the city. In fact, all the time it believed Pakistan to be a *shagoofa* (a baseless mischief), it dismissed rumours as the brainchild of goons out to make a quick profit by disrupting trade and commerce and the general well being of the city. Even post Noakhali and Bihar riots, the "Manoranjan" column implored Kanpur-walas to steer clear of the "gigantic rumours which are being manufactured within the city".¹² *Vartman* kept a sarcastic distance from all kinds of rumours - to the extent that it treated Pakistan as a giant rumour believed in only by the credulous, gullible and illiterate Muslim masses.

But as Pakistan became comprehensible and tangible, *Vartman* abandoned this sense of distance and restraint. Far from asking people to pay no heed to hearsay and gossip, the paper took to printing unauthenticated reports purporting to illumine Pakistani, i.e. Muslim actions and ambitions. With the recovery of some arms in the Muslim dominated areas in Kanpur, this paranoid abuse reached a new high. Any and every Muslim became a stock-piler of deadly war-weaponry - field rifles, mortar guns, Tommy guns. Machine guns were allegedly recovered from Muslim houses, along with gardening tools and kitchen knives. Many more deadly weapons would have been discovered, reasoned *Vartman*, but for the fact that the criminal Muslims were obviously shielded by the Muslim police officers. Rumour was patently news now, and was authenticated by being printed as news. Also, beyond a point it did not matter whether what *Vartman* was printing was true or not. For even if these reports were true, their news-value was only through their association with that omnibus bogey of Pakistan. What was news and what merited reporting had now become exclusively reports about Muslim complicity in the riots and their unstinted, total support for Pakistan. Rather than a deliberate manipulation of the news, a process of orchestration seems to be at work here.¹³ In conveying the sense of panic and by placing it within the fluid political situation, *Vartman* was voicing and feeding into the concerns of its audience, along with exploiting existing ways of thinking, to perfect and season its own discourse about Partition.

For the people of Kanpur, Pakistan was not located somewhere out there, in Punjab or Bengal, or even in Aligarh and Lucknow. Rather it was perilously close and proximate. There was no time, or indeed rationale, for maintaining a sarcastic distance, of calling Pakistan a *shagoofa*, or deriding the very idea of Pakistan as unstable. The local idiom in which *Vartman* outlined Pakistan as well as the arguments and metaphors through which it countered Partition, made Pakistan a dangerous reality within the United Provinces. Indeed for many people in the city, especially those who believed in *Vartman's* projections, Punjab and Bengal were just initial pointers to the drama that was to unfold in the heart of the United Provinces, in Kanpur itself.

There can be little doubt that *Vartman* contributed in making Partition 'present' as an immediate and unmitigated disaster about to engulf Kanpur and its residents. *Vartman* was just one of the many doomsday diviners in the city. It was one for whom, however, the question of Partition and Pakistan overwhelmed all others. In little over two years (from 1945 to 1947), *Vartman* changed its heroes, its agenda, and of course, its language. It charted the whole territory from being anti-Pakistan to being anti-Muslim. In this, it reflected the changing character of the city of Kanpur and its changed political orientations. A constant motif

in *Vartman* from about 1944, Pakistan comes across as curiously, obstinately local in flavour, used to spice up just about any news. It was both circumscribed and extended; its presence was made immediate even as its meaning was made malleable to include both a social and a political community. In *Vartman's* discourse, Pakistan acquired varied meanings and myriad hues, all of which could scarcely be contained within its larger and 'national' reality.

NOTES

- 1 This is an abridged version of an article in *Translating Partition*, eds., Ravikant and Tarun K. Saint, Katha, New Delhi, forthcoming.
- 2 *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, Benedict Anderson, Revised edition, Verso, London, 1991, p. 33.
- 3 In the 1940s, perforce, the delay was even greater - about two days before an event (of national importance) was reported by a daily newspaper, and about eight to ten days in the case of weeklies.
- 4 *The Whole World is Watching*, T. Gitlin, University of California Press, 1980, p. 2.
- 5 "The Determination Of The News Photograph," Stuart Hall, in ed. S. Cohen and J. Young, *The Manufacture Of News*, Constable, London, 1973, p. 183.
- 6 C. Wright Mills quoted in Edward Said, *Covering Islam*, Pantheon Books, New York, 1981, p. 43.
- 7 The trope used to explain Partition was frequently that of a division in the family, with Hindus and Muslims were quite often referred to as two brothers. These naturalised descriptions are still standard in accounts of the Partition, as is evident from their almost ubiquitous presence in the recent literary and journalistic endeavours commemorating the fifty years of India's Independence and Partition.
- 8 Thus while the speeches of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru were reported as their *bhashan*, *vichaar* and/or *udgaar* (speeches, ideas, statements), those of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and other League leaders were almost always captioned as their *pralaap*, *behak* and/or *dhamki* (outcry, blabber, threat): "*Leagueon Ki Uchhalkood*", *Vartman*, 24-11-1945, p. 6; "*Mister Jinnah Ka Pralaap*", *Vartman*, 11-3-1946, p. 2.
- 9 All quotations, unless otherwise specified, are from *Vartman*.
- 10 "Chargesheet," Editorial, *Vartman*, 2-10-1947, p. 2. This extremely virulent piece appeared on the Mahatma's birthday, an occasion usually reserved for accolades for him. Nothing can exemplify more the helplessness of Gandhi in the hostile climate of the time. "Pragatil" Editorial, *Vartman*, 12-11-1946, p. 2.
- 11 The Midula Sarabhai Enquiry that indicted the local Congress for the Garhmukteshwar riots was reported in *Vartman* but was seen as flawed as it "did not take into account the conspiracy of Muslims who shouted national slogans while rioting to defame the Congress". However, no further news, report or reference to these findings appears again in the paper.
- 12 "This city is a den of rumours. What can the journalists write? Such rumours germinate in the heads of the people here that even the most rational minds are bewildered", "Kampu Sharief," "Manoranjan", *Vartman*, op.cit.
- 13 Images of Welfare, P. Golding and S. Middleton, quoted in Ralph Negrine, *Politics and the Mass Media* in Britain, London, Routledge, 1994, p. 129.